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Abstract
This paper proposes the use of an argumentation framework with recursive
attacks to address a trust model in a collaborative open multi-agent system.
Our approach is focused on scenarios where agents share information about the
credibility (informational trust) they have assigned to their peers. We will rep-
resent informants’ credibility through credibility objects which will include not
only trust information but also the informant source. This leads to a recursive
setting where the reliability of certain credibility information depends on the
credibility of other pieces of information that should be subject to the same
analysis. Credibility objects are maintained in a credibility base which can have
information in conflict. In this scenario, we will formally show that our proposal
will produce a partially ordered credibility relation; such relation contains the
information that can be justified by an argumentation process.
Keywords: Argumentation, Multi-agent system, Trust, Credibility orders
1. Introduction
Open multi-agent systems have been characterized [20, 31] as multi-agent
systems where the agents have different aims and goals and they can freely
join and leave the system. In such system, it is possible to assume that agents
display important characteristics: agents can be assumed to be self-interested
and unreliable, agents lack a global perspective of the system, and there is no
central control over the agents behavior that could facilitate the prediction of
the interactions with other agents.
In this paper, we will consider a set of deliberative agents that participate in
a collaborative open multi-agent system in which each agent plays the role of an
informant for other agents, and can receive information from multiple sources,
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i.e., several agents could contribute information to another agent. It is clear
that some form of trust model is needed when the adoption of a critical decision
depends on the credibility (informational trust) assigned to the information
received from other agents. In multi-agent systems, interaction is a crucial
activity and, through interaction, agents share different kinds of information.
In our approach, agents will share information about the credibility or informa-
tional trust they have assigned to their peers and then, through this interaction,
the credibility assigned to their peers could change. Since the credibility infor-
mation received may be conflicting, we propose an argumentative formalism
for handling decisions about the credibility information that an agent (as pre-
sented in [9], the trustor) stores about their informants (as presented in [9], the
trustees). Therefore, when an agent is faced with conflictive information, the
proposed argumentation framework can be used to decide which information is
more credible, and hence, which information prevails.
In multi-agent systems, representing the credibility associated with a piece
of information and making the evaluation of this credibility possible are two
important aspects when the agents have their own beliefs and can obtain new
information from other sources [12]. Furthermore, as it was mentioned in [28],
agents acting in open environments depend on reputation and trust mecha-
nisms to evaluate the behavior of potential partners. Research in this area has
increased considerably, and reputation and trust mechanisms have become key
elements in the design of multi-agent systems [25, 33].
In [28] and [32], a set of relevant aspects to classify trust models is proposed.
In this proposal, we will consider only two of those aspects: information sources
and a trust reliability measure. In [32] the authors suggest that “...Sometimes,
as important as the trust/reputation value itself is to know how reliable is that
value and the relevance it deserves in the final decision making process...”. In
our approach, as in [36, 37], we introduce this type of information through the
use of agent identifiers that represent the information sources, avoiding in that
way the need of a separate data structure to maintain the measure of reliability.
This leads to a recursive setting in which the reliability of certain credibility
information depends on the credibility of other pieces of information that should
be subject to the same analysis.
This research is motivated by two key factors. To begin with, the existence
of large amounts of available data that intelligent agents and information system
can access nowadays from different sources such as social networks, open data
servers, and other similarly available origins. Additionally, the need of having a
way to consider the reliability of that data. Indeed, many actual applications,
such as booking services, buying and selling portals, renting locations pages or
tourist attractions recommending services, etc. request and use their customers’
evaluations to produce rankings of the products they handle. Moreover, nowa-
days there is also a tendency of having a reciprocal evaluation of the informants’
reliability. The combination of these two factors produces a significant amount
of information regarding the reliability of those informants, and these assess-
ments are becoming available. Since that information could come from different
sources (e.g., social media, open data), it is clear that substantial inconsistency
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in the obtained data could arise; therefore, there is a need for devising a way of
deciding which information prevails. In this scenario, since the sources of that
information are dynamic, we consider that the classical approaches of revising
databases eliminating information for the sake of maintaining consistency would
not be appropriated because that approach loses valuable information. In our
proposal, we examine a scenario where the two factors mentioned above are
present: we propose a formalization that allows to represent the evaluation of
informant agents and to investigate the possibility of dealing with information
from different sources that, when put together, the result could be contradictory.
Below, we will introduce an example in the stock market domain that consid-
ers the credibility that a particular agent called Tory assigns to its informants
in this topic. Our aim of using this example is to provide a more intuitive
introduction of the ideas in order to help the reader follow the presentation.
Furthermore, it will be employed as a running example for the rest of the pa-
per, though in Section 5 other applications domains will be discussed. Here,
we will restrict our research to considering credibility information for a single
topic; multi-topic or multi-context credibility orders are left as future work.
Intuitively, the notion of credibility should be irreflexive and transitive.
Example 1 (Running example). Let Alex, Barbara, and Carla (abbreviated A,
B, C) be stock market experts, and let Harry, John, and Kate (abbreviated H,
J , K) be journalists on this topic. Agent Tory (T ) has all the agents mentioned
above as its informants, and T has collected the following information about
their credibilities in the stock market topic. According to Kate, Alex is more
credible than Carla (represented A > C); and according to Harry, Carla is more
credible than Barbara, (C > B). However, for John, Barbara is more credible
than Alex, (B > A). Finally, according to the editor of a newsletter called
X-market, which specializes on this topic, the journalist Kate is more credible
than John, (K > J).
Now, assume that Tory has to decide whether Alex is more credible than
Barbara. Tory can conclude B > A using the information obtained from John
but, assuming the credibility relation is transitive, Tory can also infer A > B
from the information obtained from Kate (A > C) and Harry (C > B). In this
situation, Tory can use the information that she has about the credibility of the
journalists John, Harry and Kate to decide whether A > B or B > A prevails.
Since the editor of X-market reports that K > J , then Tory has a reason to
consider Kate more credible than John on this topic and therefore, a reason to
support that Alex is more credible than Barbara.
The example above describes a situation where an agent receives information
from different sources and shows how the agents’ subjective attribution of cred-
ibility to a particular informant can be related to the credibility attributed to
others. In our proposal, we will deal with information that an agent stores about
the credibility of its informants, and also we will assume that the information
received from an agent is as credible as the agent that supplies it.
In decision-making problems where information coming from multiple agents
is involved it is possible to use the credibility of the informants to help in making
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a decision. Similar to [1, 12, 34], we will favor the use of the word credibility
to refer to this characteristic of informant agents as this particular word carries
an intuitive sense that helps to understand the related problems. Here, the
credibility of informant agents will be represented in a credibility base that
will store the credibilities that an agent assigns to its informants and also its
reliability.
In the literature, credibility has been represented using elements of possi-
bility theory, see [6, 12], or adopting a symbolic approach, as in [8, 13, 18, 24,
35, 36, 37]. Some of these symbolic approaches, for instance [24, 35], propose
to use total orders whereas others [36, 37] adopt partial orders providing the
capability of representing cases where the credibility of two agents cannot be
compared because of different reasons, e.g., the relation between them has not
been established. In particular in [36], following belief revision techniques, the
authors formalized change operators over a credibility base to maintain it as
non-contradictory. Although those change operators have been designed using
the principle of informational economy (i.e., when accepting a new piece of
information the agent should aim at a minimal change of its previously held
beliefs), in general, when maintaining consistency some information is lost. We
will follow a different tack in this work: our proposal gives the capability of
adding multiple beliefs simultaneously (e.g., to join two or more bases) without
having to eliminate the possible contradictions that may arise.
Since obtaining information is a very expensive process, in our approach an
agent will keep all the information it receives thus allowing the possibility of
having an inconsistent credibility base. In this manner, in dynamic scenarios
with many interactions where the trust model uses witness information [28, 32],
our proposal will cover cases in which beliefs that in the current situation are less
important, but may become so in the future, are not lost. It is also important to
note that, since we keep all the information, the order in which new information
is added to the credibility base will not affect the result as occurs in [36]. In this
paper, we will propose how to equip agents with a mechanism that will allow
them to coherently infer information from their credibility base despite possible
inconsistencies. Therefore, the main contribution of our proposal is to define
an argumentation formalism which will provide the capability to coherently
infer strict partial orders from such bases. An argument in this formalism will
provide a reason to support the fact that an informant is more credible than
other. As arguments can be challenged, we will introduce different types of
attacks. Given the recursive nature of the attacks in our system, in order to
define which arguments will be accepted, and thus which conclusions will be
obtained, we will use the Argumentation Framework with Recursive Attacks
(AFRA) introduced in [3, 4], which allows attacks to the attack relation. We
will use acceptability semantics (in particular preferred extensions) to determine
which are the accepted arguments in our system, and then, we will formally show
that the conclusions of an extension from a credibility base constitute a partial
order with respect to the credibility relation.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we will introduce
how to represent the credibility of informants. In Section 3, an argumentation
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framework with three different type of attacks is proposed. Then, in Section 4 we
will define how to obtain credibility partial orders from potentially inconsistent
credibility bases using our argumentation approach. In Section 5 we discuss how
our approach can be applied to some real world domains. Section 6 analyzes
related work, and finally, in Section 7 conclusions are offered and ideas for
future work are given. All the proofs for the results will be included in the
corresponding sections.
2. Representing Informant’s Credibility
In this proposal, we consider a finite set A of identifiers for naming infor-
mant agents and each agent will be labeled with a unique name from that
set. Agents’ identifiers will be denoted with uppercase italic letters that can
have subscripts and each identifier will represent a unique agent; thus A =
{A,B, . . . , Z,A1, . . . , Zn}. Since our approach assumes a collaborative environ-
ment, it is unnecessary to make provisions to prevent identity theft. We also
assume that each agent already has a repository of the informational trust of
other agents, i.e., we do not require any particular bootstrapping mechanism.
Following [36], the credibilities an agent assigns to its informant agents is stored
in a Credibility Base as defined next.
Definition 1 (Credibility object - Credibility Base). Let A be a set of agent
identifiers and P,Q, S ∈ A. A credibility object is a pair [P > Q,S] which
represents that agent P is strictly more credible than Q, and the agent S is the
information source of the credibility element P > Q. A credibility base is a
finite set C of credibility objects.
A credibility base stores credibility objects that are pairs of credibility el-
ements together with their associated information source which will represent
the reliability of the associated credibility element. Observe that, as in [36],
the credibility base itself stores the information for considering the reliability of
each element. Thus, there is no need for a separate data structure maintaining
the measure of reliability of credibility elements. We include below a simple
example that will be used for introducing the main concepts of our approach.
Example 2. Consider the credibility base:
C2 = {[A>C,K], [C>B,H], [B>A, J ], [K>J,X]}.
This set represents the information introduced above for our running example:
the agent K has informed that A is more credible than C (A > C), the agent
H has informed that C > B, J has informed that B > A, and X (the editor of
the newsletter) has informed that K > J .
Consider the credibility base C2 from Example 2 where the following two
credibility elements A > C and C > B are explicitly stored. It is clear that from
C2, A > B can be inferred, which is in contradiction with the credibility element
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B > A informed by J that is explicitly stored in C. Next, we will introduce three
functions: ce(C), cl(C), and rel(C) that will be used in the formalism proposed
below. The first function returns all the credibility elements of a credibility
base, i.e., ce(C) = {P >Q : [P >Q,S] ∈ C}. Note that ce(C) is a finite set that
corresponds to the projection of C with respect to those credibility elements that
are explicitly represented in C. Then, cl(C) will include all credibility elements
that can be inferred from ce(C) by the transitive closure of ce(C). Considering
the credibility base from Example 2, ce(C2) = {A>C,C > B,B > A,K > J}
and cl(C2) = {A > C,C > B,B > A,A > B,C > A,B > C,K > J,A > A,B >
B,C>C}.
In a credibility object [A>C,K], K is the source of A > C, andK represents
the reliability of A > C. Given a credibility base C, the function rel(C) returns
the set of agent identifiers that are sources of credibility elements in C, i.e.,
rel(C) = {S : [P >Q,S] ∈ C}. This function will be used to determine the set
of agent identifiers that represents the reliability of an argument. As we will
show below, an argument will be composed of a set of credibility objects, and
to obtain its reliability the sources of those objects will be considered.
Observe that given a credibility base C, cl(C) can have contradictory cred-
ibility elements, e.g., A > B and B > A both belong to cl(C2). Also note
that both elements were obtained from different sources and, for that reason,
their reliability could be different. Therefore, in the following sections we will
propose an argumentation formalism that given a credibility base it will find a
non-contradictory subset of cl(C) that has the information that is more reliable.
We will also show below that this subset is a strict partial order of credibility
elements.
3. Arguments and attacks
Each credibility element that can be inferred from a credibility base C will
have an argument associated that supports it, and such argument will contain
the reliability information for that inference. This reliability information will
be used for comparing arguments supporting contradictory conclusions. An
argument is a minimal set of credibility objects as defined next.
Definition 2 (Argument). Let C be a credibility base, A be a set of agents,
and B,C ∈ A where B = C, an argument X for the conclusion B>C from C
is a set of credibility objects X ⊆ C, such that B >C ∈ cl(X ) and there is no
X ′ ⊂ X holding that B>C ∈ cl(X ′). The set of all arguments that can be built
from C will be denoted as ArgsC. If X is an argument for the conclusion B>C,
sometimes we will use the notation 〈X , B>C〉.
Observe that it is not possible to have arguments for a conclusion such as
A > A. This is concordant with the intuition that credibility is an irreflexive
relation since agents cannot be more credible than themselves. An argument is
a minimal set with respect to set inclusion and, therefore, an argument cannot
have a cycle. Note that even though an argument X can have one or more
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credibility objects, each argument has only one conclusion. Any proper subset
of an argument is itself an argument for a different conclusion, and represents
an intermediate reasoning step in the argument in which it is contained and,
trivially, an argument is a subargument of itself. This notion is captured in the
subargument relation defined next.
Definition 3 (Subargument). Let C be a credibility base and X ,Z ∈ ArgsC,
then Z is a subargument of X if and only if Z ⊆ X .
The following proposition shows that the argument construction is mono-
tonic. That is, the addition of credibility objects to a credibility base does not
preclude the construction of an argument.
Proposition 1. Let 〈X , A > B〉 be an argument that can be built from the
credibility base C and C ⊆ C′ then 〈X , A>B〉 can also be built from C′.
Proof. Straightforward from Definition 2.
Example 3. Consider again the credibility base of our running example intro-
duced in Example 2:
C2 = {[A>C,K], [C>B,H], [B>A, J ], [K>J,X]}.
There are seven arguments that can be built from C2. For the sake of clarity, in
this example we will present three of them, nevertheless the remaining arguments
will be presented when the full example is studied in greater depth in Section 4.
For instance, from C2 it is possible to build the argument A2 = {[A>C,K], [C>
B,H]} for the conclusion A>B, the argument A1 = {[A>C,K], [B >A, J ]}
for the conclusion B>C, and A3 = {[B>A, J ]} for the conclusion B>A. Note
that A3 is a subargument of A1. On the other hand, there are several subsets
of C2 that are not arguments. For instance, the set N = {[A > C,K], [C >
B,H], [B > A, J ]} is not an argument because for any potential conclusion in
cl(N ) the set N is not minimal. A similar situation occurs with the set {[B>
A, J ], [K>J,X]} and with the set {[A>C,K], [K>J,X]}
Figure 1 depicts the three arguments introduced in Example 3. There, each
argument is represented as a table of one column with its name and conclusion
at the top, and below them, the set of credibility objects used for obtaining
the conclusion. Given an argument X , the set rel(X ) contains all the agent
identifiers which are sources of the credibility objects in X , and hence rel(X )
represents the reliability of X . Considering the arguments from Example 3, we
have rel(A1) = {K,J}, rel(A2) = {K,H}, and rel(A3) = {J}.
Observe that in Example 3 the argument A2 provides a reason to conclude
that A is more credible than B, whereas A3 concludes the contrary, i.e., B
is more credible than A. We next introduce the definition of arguments with
contradictory conclusions that will be used in our formalization below.
Definition 4 (Contradictory conclusions). Let X ,Z be two arguments in ArgsC.
If X concludes B>C and Z concludes C>B, for some B,C ∈ A, then X and
Z have contradictory conclusions.
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[ A > C, K ]
[ C > B, H ]
[ B > A, J ][ A > C, K ]
[ B > A, J ]
??1, B > C ? ??2, A > B ? ??3, B > A ?
Figure 1: Arguments from Example 3
Clearly, arguments with contradictory conclusions are in conflict. As we will
discuss in detail below, we will study three types of conflicts that will lead to
three different attack relations. The first type, called trust-attacks, captures
the type of conflicts related to contradictory conclusions. The second type of
attacks, called reliability-attacks, captures how an argument can challenge the
reliability of an argument that trust-attacks another. The third type, called
indirect-reliability-attacks, captures the indirect conflict that is implicit between
two reliability-attacks that challenge opposing positions.
These three attack relations together will characterize an AFRA’s recursive
attack relation, and that framework will be used to determine the arguments
that are finally accepted. For convenience, given a credibility base C we will
denote with TAttsC the set of trust-attacks from C, with RAttsC the set of
reliability-attacks from C, and with IAttsC the set of indirect-reliability-attacks
from C. Below we will explain the intuitions that motivate each type of attack
and present their definitions.
3.1. Trust-Attacks
A trust-attack captures the conflict between arguments that conclude con-
tradictory credibilities. Intuitively, argument Y trust-attacks another X if either
they have contradictory conclusions, or there is a subargument of X having a
contradictory conclusion with Y; that is, either Y contradicts the credibility
concluded by X or Y contradicts an intermediate reasoning step of X . Next,
we formalize this notion.
Definition 5 (Trust-Attack). Let X ,Y be two arguments in ArgsC, we will
say that (Y,X ) ∈ TAttsC if there exists a subargument Z of X such that Y
and Z have contradictory conclusions. This subargument Z is referred as the
disagreement subargument of (Y,X ) and denoted dis((Y ,X )) = Z.
Recall that every argument is trivially a subargument of itself. Thus, an
argument A will be attacked by (and will also attack) any other argument B
such that A and B have contradictory conclusions. Therefore, intuitively an
argument can trust-attack other argument at its conclusion or at an interme-
diate point (subargument). Figure 2 shows the three arguments introduced
in Example 3 and the trust-attacks between them; these attacks are depicted
with solid arrows. Each arrow is labeled with a lowercase Greek letter, e.g.,
there exists a trust-attack α = (A2,A3) because A2 and A3 have contradictory
conclusions. An analogous situation holds for β = (A3,A2). The trust-attack
λ = (A2,A1) occurs because A1 has a subargument concluding B>A and A2
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concludes A>B. Finally, the trust-attack π = (A1,A2) occurs because A1 and
a subargument of A2 have contradictory conclusions.
[ A > C, K ]
[ C > B, H ]
[ B > A, J ][ A > C, K ]
[ B > A, J ]
??1, B > C ? ??2, A > B ? ??3, B > A ?
?
??
?
Figure 2: Trust-attacks between arguments from Example 3
In the case shown in Figure 2, where only three arguments are considered, a
kind of blocking situation occurs because all the arguments are trust-attacked
by another argument. Nevertheless, in the credibility base C2 there is more
information that can be used. In the next subsection, we will show how an
attack can be attacked in order to decide which information prevails; but first,
we will show some results that are related to the previous definitions and that
characterize our framework.
The following result shows that any argument built from a credibility base
has internal coherence. That is, an argument should be consistent by itself, and
thus it will not attack itself.
Proposition 2. There is no X ∈ ArgsC such that (X ,X ) ∈ TAttsC.
Proof. Suppose that (X ,X ) ∈ TAttsC, then there is an argument Z which is
a subargument of X such that X and Z have contradictory conclusions. That
is, if X concludes B > C then Z concludes C > B. Then, by Definition 2 it
holds that {B > C,C > B} ⊆ cl(X ). Therefore, there exists X ′ ⊂ X such that
B > C ∈ cl(X ′), contradiction.
The following proposition shows that trust-attacks happen in pairs. That is,
if an argument trust-attacks another argument, the attacking argument will, in
turn, also be trust-attacked.
Proposition 3. Let X ,Y ∈ ArgsC. If (Y,X ) ∈ TAttsC then there is Z ∈ ArgsC
such that (Z,Y) ∈ TAttsC.
Proof. If (Y,X ) ∈ TAttsC then by Definition 5 there is a subargument Z of
X such that Y and Z have contradictory conclusions. Then, given that any
argument is trivially a subargument of itself, by Definition 5 it holds that
(Z,Y) ∈ TAttsC.
The following corollary establishes the notion of symmetry of trust-attacks
between arguments with contradictory conclusions.
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Corollary 1. Let α = (Y,X ) ∈ TAttsC. If dis(α) = X then (X ,Y) ∈ TAttsC.
Proof. Straightforward from Definition 5 and Proposition 3.
3.2. Reliability-Attacks
We introduce now the possibility of representing an attack to an attack
called reliability-attack. Below we will explain how with this form of attack the
reliability of the information can be used to decide which argument prevails
when arguments for contradictory conclusions are obtained.
Recall that given an argument X the set rel(X ) represents the reliability of X
and contains all the agent identifiers that are sources of the credibility objects in
X . For instance, as shown for the arguments from Example 3, rel(A1) = {K,J},
rel(A2) = {K,H} and rel(A3) = {J}.
Consider again the credibility base C2 and the Figure 2 where trusts-attacks
α = (A2,A3) and β = (A3,A2) are depicted. From C2 the argument A4 =
{[K > J,X]} concluding K > J can be built. Observe that the argument A2
has K as one of the sources of its information (K ∈ rel(A2)), and A3 has J
as the source of its information (J ∈ rel(A3)). In this scenario, we can use the
argument A4 to establish a preference of A2 over A3, given that A2 has sources
that can be deemed as more credible than some of the sources in A3. That is,
A4 establishes that A2 is based on more reliable information than A3. Following
this line of reasoning, argument A4 challenges the validity of the trust-attack β
(see Figure 3 where this challenge is depicted with a dashed line).
This form of conflict will be captured by an attack to an attack that will
be introduced below in Definition 6; but first, we will introduce two auxiliary
notions: the origin of an attack α, denoted og(α), and the target of an attack,
denoted tg(α). Given an attack α = (A, T ), the first element of the pair is the
origin of the attack, i.e., og(α)=A, while the second element of the pair is the
target of the attack, i.e., tg(α)=T . Since in our framework there can be attacks
to arguments and attacks to attacks, the target T could be either an argument
or an attack.
Reliability-attacks, as we have discussed above, capture the preference of
some arguments considering how reliable they are in light of their sources. This
notion will formalize the intuition of challenging attacks.
Next, we will formally introduce the basic form of reliability-attacks, that
will challenge trust-attacks in TAttsC (as was exemplified above). Once we have
introduced the indirect-reliability-attacks, we will present the recursive version
of reliability-attacks capable of targeting such form of attack.
Definition 6 (Basic Reliability-attack). Let X be an argument in ArgsC con-
cluding C > B and β ∈ TAttsC such that no agent in the conclusion of og(β)
appears in rel(X ). We say that (X , β) ∈ RAttsC if and only if B ∈ rel(og(β))
and C ∈ rel(dis(β)).
Example 4. Consider the credibility base of our running example:
C2 = {[A>C,K], [C>B,H], [B>A, J ], [K>J,X]}.
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[ A > C, K ]
[ C > B, H ]
[ B > A, J ][ A > C, K ]
[ B > A, J ]
??1, B > C ? ??2, A > B ? ??3, B > A ?
?
??
?
?
[ K > J, X ]
??4, K > J ?
Figure 3: Reliability-attack described in Example 4
In Example 3, we have shown how from C2 it is possible to build the arguments
A2,A3, and A1, and Figure 2 depicts a situation where the trust-attacks α, β,
γ, and π appear. Note that the argument A4 = {[K >J,X]} can also be built
from C2. Figure 3 shows that A4 effects a reliability-attack to β, denoted γ =
(A4, β), since we have that og(β) = A3, neither A nor B are in rel(A4) = {X},
J ∈ rel(A3), the disagreement subargument of β is dis(β) = A2, K ∈ rel(A2),
and K>J is the conclusion of A4.
For convenience, a reliability-attack will be depicted using dashed arrows
(e.g., γ in Figure 3), and if we consider only the arguments that can be obtained
from C2, there is no other reliability-attack. In particular, it is worth to mention
that A4 does not produce a reliability-attack to π. To understand why, observe
that J ∈ rel(og(π)) but the disagreement subargument for π is dis(π) = {[C >
B,H]} and K /∈ rel(dis(π)).
Another important remark concerning Definition 6 is that it forbids circu-
lar defenses using reliability-attacks. Observe that the argument producing a
reliability-attack, should not contain as part of its reliability (i.e., its sources)
any of those agents involved in the trust conflict which it aims to settle. In other
words, an argument will not be able to challenge the reliability of a trust-attack
if some of its sources are the ones that cause such trust-attack.
Although in Figure 3 the reliability-attack γ breaks the blocking situation
between arguments A2 and A3, there are more arguments and attacks in this
scenario and more elements need to be considered to decide which arguments
prevail. The complete analysis of the situation will be shown in Section 4.
The following proposition shows that if an argument challenges a trust-attack
which models the conflict between two arguments, it will also challenge every
other trust-attack that involves any superargument of such arguments.
Proposition 4. Let C be a credibility base, α = (W,V) ∈ TAttsC and (X , α) ∈
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RAttsC. For every trust-attack β = (W,Y) ∈ TAttsC where the argument V is a
subargument of Y it holds that (X , β) ∈ RAttsC.
Proof. Since γ = (X , α) ∈ RAttsC, by Definition 6 it holds that if X concludes
A > B then B ∈ rel(og(α)) and A ∈ rel(dis(α)). Also, by Definition 5 it holds
dis(α) = dis(β), then A ∈ rel(dis(β)). Therefore, by Definition 6 it holds that
(X , β) ∈ RAttsC.
3.3. Indirect-Reliability-Attacks
To motivate this new form of attack, we will extend our running example
with more information objects that will introduce more arguments (see Exam-
ple 5).
Example 5. Consider the credibility base
C5 = {[A>C,K], [C>B,H], [B>A, J ], [K>J,X], [J >H, Y ]}
which is in fact C2 ∪ {[J >H, Y ]}. The new credibility object represents that the
newsletter Y-invest (abbreviated Y ) has informed that agent J is more credible
than H. Note that from C5 we have the same arguments and attacks shown
in Example 4 and, in addition, the argument A5 = {[J >H, Y ]} can be built.
This argument produces a reliability-attack δ = (A5, α) because og(α) = A2,
H ∈ rel(A2), the disagreement subargument of α is dis(α) = A3, J ∈ rel(A3),
and A5 has J > H as conclusion. Furthermore, note that A5 also produces a
reliability-attack θ to λ, since H ∈ rel(og(λ)) and J ∈ rel(dis(λ)). The situation
is shown in Figure 4.
[ A > C, K ]
[ C > B, H ]
[ B > A, J ][ A > C, K ]
[ B > A, J ]
??1, B > C ? ??2, A > B ? ??3, B > A ?
?
?
?
?
?
[ K > J, X ]
??4, K > J ?
[ J > H, Y ]
??5, J > H ?
?
?
Figure 4: Reliability-attacks between arguments from Example 5
Indirect-reliability-attacks will be used to capture an implicit situation of
conflict that can occur between two reliability-attacks. Observe in Figure 4
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that the reliability-attack γ challenges the trust-attack β and, simultaneously,
the reliability-attack δ challenges the trust-attack α. Therefore, considering
δ and γ it could be seen that γ is representing a preference of A2 over A3,
meanwhile δ represents the contrary, and thus this means an implicit conflict
between reliability-attacks such as δ and γ exists. Also note that, if we suppose
that the reliability-attacks δ and γ are successful, then α and β will be ineffec-
tive. This leads to an undesirable situation where arguments with contradictory
conclusions, such as A2 and A3, could hold together.
To capture a conflict as the one between δ and γ discussed above, we will
introduce indirect-reliability-attacks which originate from an argument and tar-
get a reliability-attack. The argument producing the indirect-reliability-attack
will be the same that produces the reliability-attack which is in conflict with
the reliability-attack that is the target of the indirect-reliability-attack. As we
did for the basic reliability-attack, we will present the basic indirect-reliability-
attacks that target basic reliability-attacks next.
Definition 7 (Basic Indirect-Reliability-attack). Let α, β ∈ RAttsC where og(α)
= X and tg(α), tg(β) ∈ TAttsC. We say that (X , β) ∈ IAttsC if and only if either
og(tg(α)) = dis(tg(β)) or og(tg(α)) = tg(tg(β))
Example 6. Consider the credibility base C5 from Example 5. In this scenario,
given that γ is a reliability-attack and og(γ) = A4, we have that A4 produces
the indirect-reliability-attack φ to δ. This is so because tg(γ) = β, og(β) = A3
and because tg(δ) = α ∈ TAttsC5 , tg(α) = A3. An analogous situation holds for
the indirect-reliability-attack ε: tg(δ) = α, og(α) = A2 and because tg(γ) = β ∈
TAttsC5 , tg(β) = A2. These indirect-reliability-attacks, together with previously
described items, are depicted using dotted arrows in Figure 5. In addition, note
that there is no indirect-attack to θ.
[ A > C, K ]
[ C > B, H ]
[ B > A, J ][ A > C, K ]
[ B > A, J ]
??1, B > C ? ??2, A > B ? ??3, B > A ?
?
?
?
?
?
[ K > J, X ]
??4, K > J ?
[ J > H, Y ]
??5, J > H ?
?
?
?
?
Figure 5: Indirect-reliability-attacks described from Example 6
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As we have stated above Definition 6, reliability-attacks can also challenge
indirect-reliability-attacks, and the intuition is similar to how these attacks chal-
lenged trust-attacks: a reliability-attack poses a preference over the arguments
involved in a conflict. Following this line of reasoning, indirect-reliability-attacks
should be capable of targeting these reliability-attacks, and in turn such indirect-
reliability-attacks can also be challenged by reliability-attacks. Clearly, this nat-
urally leads to a mutually recursive definition where both types of attacks can
attack each other.
Definition 8 (Reliability-attack / Indirect-Reliability-attack). Let X be an
argument in ArgsC with conclusion C>B. It will hold that:
• (X , β) ∈ RAttsC iff β ∈ IAttsC is such that no agent in the conclusion of
og(β) is in rel(X ), B ∈ rel(og(β)), and C ∈ rel(og(tg(β))).
• (X , β) ∈ IAttsC iff β ∈ RAttsC and there is α ∈ RAttsC such that og(α) = X
and og(tg(α)) = og(tg(tg(β))).
We extend in Example 7 our running example to show a scenario where
there exists a reliability-attack targeting an indirect-reliability-attack (which
corresponds to the second condition from Definition 8).
[ A > C, K ]
[ C > B, H ]
[ B > A, J ][ A > C, K ]
[ B > A, J ]
??1, B > C ? ??2, A > B ? ??3, B > A ?
?
?
?
?
?
[ K > J, X ]
??4, K > J ?
[ J > H, Y ]
??5, J > H ?
?
?
[ Y > X, T ]
??6, Y > X ?
?
?
?
Figure 6: Indirect-reliability-attacks described in Example 7
Example 7. Consider the credibility base
C7 = {[A>C,K], [C>B,H], [B>A, J ], [K>J,X], [J >H, Y ], [Y >X, T ]}
that corresponds to C5 ∪ {[Y >X, T ]}. Here, the new credibility object is ex-
pressing that for the agent Tory the newsletter Y-invest is more credible than
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X-market. Note that from C7 we have the same arguments and attacks shown in
Example 6 and, in addition, the argument A6 = {[Y >X, T ]} can be built. The
argument A6 provides information to prefer the indirect-reliability-attack ε over
the indirect-reliability-attack φ; this is so because A6 establishes that A5 (which
is the argument producing ε) is based on more reliable sources than A4 (which
is the argument that produces φ). This preference is captured by a reliability-
attack from A6 to the indirect-reliability-attack φ, as we depict in Figure 6;
this intuitions are formalized in Definition 6. In this particular case, we have
that μ = (A6, φ) is a reliability-attack because og(φ) = A4, X ∈ rel(A4), and
tg(φ) = δ, og(δ) = A5 and Y ∈ rel(A5).
Next, we will present another example to show indirect-reliability-attacks
that target reliability-attacks, which in turn target indirect-reliability-attacks.
????????????
?????????????
????????? ??
?????????????
?????? ?????
?????????? ??
?? ?????????
?????? ??????
??
??
????????????
?????????????
????????????
?????????????
??
????
??
??
?? ??
??
??
??
????
??
?? ????
Figure 7: Arguments and attacks from Example 8
Example 8. Consider the following credibility base:
C8 = {[R>S,L], [S>R,M ], [L>M,U ], [M>L, V ], [U >V,O], [V >U,P ]}.
Figure 7 shows the arguments and attacks that can be built from C8. There are
six trust-attacks between these arguments: κ1, κ2 capture the conflict between
A20 and A21, κ3, κ4 the conflict between A22 and A23, and κ5, κ6 the conflict
between A24 and A25. There are four basic reliability-attacks: ω1, ω2, ω3 and ω4;
and there are four basic indirect-reliability-attacks: η1, η2, η3 and η4. Note that
there are two non basic reliability-attacks: ω5 and ω6, and two non basic indirect-
reliability-attacks: η5 and η6. In particular, observe that η5 = (A25, ω6) occurs
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because there is ω5 such that og(ω5) = A25, and it also holds that tg(ω5) = η1,
og(η1) = A22 and tg(ω6) = η2, tg(η1) = ω1, og(ω1) = A22. An analogous
situation occurs for η6.
In the following section, we will introduce an argumentation formalism for
analyzing which arguments and attacks prevail.
4. Obtaining the credibility relation through argumentation
As described above, arguments can attack each other, but they can chal-
lenge attacks as well. It is clear that conflicting elements cannot be accepted
together and their status need to be evaluated, and in such evaluation it is nec-
essary to consider their acceptability status. Intuitively, an argument should be
accepted if it is able to survive the attacks it receives, and should be rejected
otherwise [30]. Since in our formalization attacks can also receive attacks, the
evaluation process should also be capable of deciding whether an attack can be
regarded as effective or not. In our proposal, the goal of the evaluation process
is that after everything is considered, the accepted arguments will provide the
credibility elements that will be justified from the credibility base.
In this work, we will use the evaluation approach of argumentation semantics
in abstract argumentation frameworks [14]. Such semantics are abstracted from
argument internal structures and are focused on establishing which arguments
can be regarded as accepted considering just the attacks. In particular, given the
recursive nature of the attacks in our system, we will use an AFRA introduced
in [3, 4], which extends the classical approach of [14] by allowing attacks to the
attack relation.
An AFRA is expressed as a set of arguments and a set of attacks, where an
attack is a pair (A,T) such that A is an argument and T is either an argument
or an attack [4]. To instantiate an AFRA, we will use arguments and attacks
obtained from a credibility base, and then we will analyze which elements are
accepted from this framework. Thus, each credibility base will characterize a
particular AFRA which will be called its associated AFRA.
Definition 9 (Associated AFRA). Let C be a credibility base, the associated
AFRA of C is (ArgsC,AttsC) where ArgsC is the set of arguments that can
be built from C, and AttsC = TAttsC ∪ RAttsC ∪ IAttsC with TAttsC its set of
trust-attacks, RAttsC its set of reliability-attacks and IAttsC its set of indirect-
reliability-attacks.
It is important to remark that the sets of attacks are pairwise disjoint by
their own nature, i.e., every attack belongs to only one form of attack.
Example 9. Consider for instance the credibility base C7 from Example 7. The
asociated AFRA (ArgsC7 ,AttsC7) of that credibility base is depicted in Figure 8.
Observe that ArgsC7 has ten arguments: six of them were shown in previous
examples, and there are other four arguments: A7, A8, A9, and A10 (see Fig-
ure 8). Note that A3 is a subargument of A1 and A7; A9 is a subargument of A2
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and A7; A8 is a subargument of A1 and A2. There are twelve trust-attacks in
TAttsC7 , fifteen reliability-attacks in RAttsC7 and six indirect-reliability-attacks
in IAttsC7 .
? ?
??
??
? ??
?? ?
??
?
??
?
?
????
????
??
??
???
???
??
??
?
?
?
?
??
?? ??
??
??
??
??? ?
???? ???????
???? ???????
??????? ????
???? ???????
???? ???????
??????? ????
???? ???????
??????? ????
???? ???????
??????? ????
???? ???????
??????? ????
???? ???????
??????? ????
???? ???????
???? ???????
??????? ????
???? ???????
??????? ? ??
???? ???????
??????? ????
???? ???? ??
???? ???? ??
???????? ????
Figure 8: Associated AFRA of C7
Following [4], the first step towards determining the accepted arguments
from an associated AFRA (ArgsC,AttsC) is to establish the existing attacks
and consequent defeats. A defeat to an argument or an attack in an AFRA is
determined by analyzing a recursive attack relation [4]. In addition, argument
defeats are also propagated to the attacks they originate. In what follows, we
will slightly adapt the formalization of defeats in an AFRA to use them in an
associated AFRA of a credibility base. In the definitions below we will use the
functions og(·) and tg(·) that were introduced in Section 3.2. The reader should
note that these two notions correspond to src and trg defined in [3, 4] which we
renamed to og and tg in order to avoid confusion with our notion of source of a
credibility element.
Definition 10 (Defeat in asociated AFRA). Let 〈ArgsC,AttsC〉 be the asociated
AFRA of a credibility base C, α, β ∈ AttsC and X ∈ ArgsC ∪ AttsC:
• α directly defeats X iff tg(α) = X.
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• α indirectly defeats β iff tg(α) = X, and X = og(β).
It is said that α defeats X, iff α directly or indirectly defeats X.
Example 10. In the associated AFRA (ArgsC7 ,AttsC7) depicted in Figure 8,
for instance, we have that α directly defeats A3, α indirectly defeats β, β directly
defeats A2, β indirectly defeats α, δ directly defeats α, γ directly defeats β, φ
directly defeats δ, and μ directly defeats φ.
Note that attacks are the only elements of the framework capable of defeating
arguments and other attacks. This is also coherent with the fact that an attack
can be rendered ineffective by either attacking the attack itself or the argument
where originates.
In abstract argumentation, the formal definitions of declarative methods
ruling the argument evaluation process are called argumentation semantics. In
an AFRA, a semantics definition specifies how to obtain a set of extensions.
An extension E of an AFRA is simply a subset of arguments and attacks that
represents a set of elements which can survive together or are collectively ac-
ceptable [4].
We will introduce the basic elements from which the different semantics are
defined [5]. The notion of conflict-free set captures the idea that an extension
is a set of elements that “can stand together”; in other words, the attacks in
the set do not defeat elements of the set. The notion of acceptability establishes
that an argument or an attack X is acceptable with respect to (or defended by)
a set of elements if this set defeats every attack defeating X. Finally, the notion
of admissibility captures the intuition that an extension is a set of elements
that “can stand on its own”, i.e., it is a conflict-free set and it defends all its
elements.
Definition 11 (Conflict-freeness, Acceptability, Admissibility). Let 〈ArgsC,AttsC〉
be the asociated AFRA of a credibility base C, S ⊆ ArgsC ∪ AttsC, and X ∈
ArgsC ∪ AttsC. Then:
• S is conflict-free iff there is no α,Y ∈ S s.t. α ∈ AttsC and α defeats Y.
• X is acceptable w.r.t. S iff for all α ∈ AttsC such that α defeats X, there
exists β ∈ S such that β defeats α.
• S is an admissible set iff S is conflict-free and each element in S is ac-
ceptable w.r.t. S.
It is worth mentioning that the concepts presented by Definition 11 have
a remarkable difference with those used in classical abstract argumentation
frameworks. In such frameworks, these concepts are only defined in terms argu-
ments [14]; instead, as we are in the context of the AFRA, here, these notions
are defined in terms of arguments and attacks. This is because in an AFRA not
only arguments can be defeated, but also attacks (for a more detailed discussion
see [4]).
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Example 11. In the associated AFRA (ArgsC7 ,AttsC7) of C7 depicted in Fig-
ure 8, we have that the set {A2,A3, β} is not conflict free because β defeats A2,
and the set {A3, β, γ} is not conflict free since γ defeats β. Also note that A3 is
not acceptable with respect to {A5,A1} since this set has no element that defeats
α. However, A3 is acceptable with respect to {A5,A1, π} given that π indirectly
defeats α. Finally, observe that the set {A5,A3, δ} is not admissible since δ
is not acceptable with respect to the set (it is not defended form φ), whereas
{A5,A3, μ, δ} and {A1, ρ1, θ, ρ5} are admissible.
If we look further into the admissible set {A1, ρ1, θ, ρ5} from Example 11, it
can be noted that adding elements such as A5 or μ to that set will also result
into an admissible set. We can keep adding elements and at some point we will
reach a maximal admissible set such that adding any other element will result
into a non admissible set. Such maximal admissible sets will hold together all
the elements of the framework that can stand by their own, and thus should be
regarded as accepted. This idea of maximizing accepted elements is expressed
by the preferred semantics. Next, the formalization of these intuitions based
in [3, 4] are presented.
Definition 12 (Preferred Extension). Let 〈ArgsC,AttsC〉 be the asociated AFRA
of a credibility base C and S ⊆ ArgsC∪AttsC. The set S is a preferred extension
of 〈ArgsC,AttsC〉 iff it is a maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) admissible set.
Example 12. Consider the credibility base C7 and its associated AFRA as de-
picted in Figure 8. This credibility base has only one preferred extension EC7 =
{A6,A5,A3,A1,A4,A8,A10, μ, ρ11, ρ12, ρ1, θ, δ, ρ3, ψ1, ψ2, , τ1, π, τ4, β,
ρ10, ρ9, ρ7, τ9, ρ5, ρ6}.
There are several argumentation semantics defined for AFRAs [3, 4]; never-
theless, since we do not aim to contrast the results of every conceivable seman-
tics applied to our approach, in this work we will only consider the preferred
semantics. This semantics provides a sensible approach to show how the argu-
mentation machinery can be used for dealing with the different conflicts that we
have described in the previous sections and for deciding which elements prevail.
In Example 12 we have shown that in same cases one single preferred exten-
sion holds; however, as shown in Example 13, when there are mutual attacks
between unchallenged arguments several extensions hold (one for each mutually
exclusive option).
Example 13. Consider the credibility base C8 introduced in Example 8. The
associated AFRA of this base is characterized by the arguments and attacks
that were depicted in Figure 7. From such associated AFRA there are two
preferred extensions: EC81 = {A20,A23,A25, κ1, κ4, κ6, ω2, ω4, ω5, η2, η3, η5} and
EC82 = {A21,A22,A24, κ2, κ3, κ5, ω1, ω3, ω6, η1, η4, η6}.
As it was mentioned, the justification state of a credibility element (e.g.,
A>B) in a base C will depend on the status of the argument that supports that
credibility element in the associated AFRA 〈ArgsC,AttsC〉; in turn, this status
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depends on the membership to an extension of such an argument. Note that,
given a credibility base C, there always exists an associated AFRA from which it
is possible to obtain the extensions containing the acceptable arguments; hence,
we will introduce to our framework the notion of extension of a credibility base
that considers preferred extensions which satisfy a particular constraint. There
can be AFRA extensions that are not extensions for a credibility base.
Definition 13 (Extension of a credibility base). Let C be a credibility base and
E a preferred extension of its associated AFRA 〈ArgsC,AttsC〉. We will say that
E is an extension of a credibility base C iff for any argument X ∈ ArgsC if every
subargument Z ⊂ X is in E then X is in E.
Definition 14 (Justified credibilities). Let C be a credibility base and E an
extension of C, then the set of justified credibilities of E is JE = {A > B :
〈X , A>B〉 ∈ E}.
For instance, the credibility base C7 has only one extension that is the only
preferred extension EC7 of its associated AFRA 〈ArgsC7 ,AttsC7〉, which was
shown in Example 12. Then, the justified credibilities of C7 are JEC7 = {X >
Y, J > H,B > A,B > C,K > J,A > C,K > H}. Note that in this case the
credibility information in C7 is enough for deciding in every conflictive situation.
In contrast, consider now the credibility base Cm introduced in Example 13; in
that example, we have shown that its associated AFRA has two preferred ex-
tensions ECm1 and ECm2. Observe that both are extensions of Cm, therefore
there are two possible sets of justified credibilities, JECm1 = {L > M,R > S}
and JECm2 = {M > L,S > R}. Having more than one justified credibility set
means that the credibility information in the base is not enough for deciding
in every conflictive situation. In this work, we do not propose any particular
mechanism to chose among multiple extensions. Nevertheless, a skeptical ap-
proach could involve to consider the intersection of all the extensions, i.e., only
those arguments that appear in every extension (see [15] for more details on the
implication of such approach).
Next, with the following example we show that not every extension of the
associated AFRA of a credibility base is an extension of that credibility base.
Example 14. Consider a credibility base Cs = {[O > P,X], [P > Q, Y ], [Q >
O,Z]}. From this credibility base we can build six arguments: A31 for O > P ,
A32 for P > Q, A33 for Q > O, A34 for O > Q, A35 for P > O and A36 for
Q > P . In Figure 9 we depict the associated AFRA of Cs. The preferred exten-
sion from such AFRA are ECs1 = {A31,A34,A32, α4, α13, α10, α5, α2}, ECs2 =
{A31,A36,A33, α4, α7, α9, α6, α1}, ECs3 = {A35,A33,A32, α3, α12, α8, α6, α2},
ECs4 = {A31,A33,A32, α4, α6, α2}. Observe that ECs1, ECs2 and ECs3 are also
extensions of Cs, whereas ECs4 is not. This is because ECs4, for instance, in-
cludes A31 and A32 but it does not include the superargument A34. In addition,
note that if ECs4 was considered an extension of Cs, the set of justified credibil-
ities for such extension would had been {O > P,P > Q,Q > O} which clearly
is not coherent with what we expect from a set of justified credibilities.
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Figure 9: Associated AFRA of Cs
It is worth mentioning that using the AFRA as the basis for the accep-
tance calculus allows us to apply any existing algorithm for preferred exten-
sion enumeration for Dung’s classical abstract argumentation frameworks. Even
though it is known that preferred extension enumeration is a costly process, the
argumentation community has recently developed several methods that show
promising empirical results, as it can be seen in the International Competition
on Computational Models of Argumentation [40]. To use such methods, it is
possible to translate an AFRA into a classical argumentation framework, as
proposed in [4]. This transformation can be polynomially computed and there
is a bijection between the preferred extensions of the resulting framework and
those of the original AFRA.
Once the preferred extensions are calculated, we can easily discard those
AFRA’s extensions that are not extensions of the credibility base and then pick
the conclusion of every argument in each of the remaining extensions to build
the sets of justified credibilities. Both tasks can be polynomially computed. The
former requires just to check for every pair of arguments in the extension if the
super-argument that can be built by combining them is also in the extension.
The latter can be trivially computed by iterating among the arguments in the
extension.
Next, we include results that characterize our framework. The following
proposition shows that an extension of a credibility base is coherent with respect
to the argument composition. That is, if an argument is accepted then every
part of it will be accepted as well.
Proposition 5. Let C be a credibility base and E an extension of C. It holds
that if an argument X is in E then every subargument Z of X belongs to E.
Proof. Assume that X is in a extension E of C and suppose that there is a
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subargument Z of X such that Z /∈ E; note that {Z}∪E is conflict free. Then,
by Definition 12, it holds that Z is not acceptable w.r.t. E. Therefore, since
Z /∈ E there must exist α defeating Z and there is no β ∈ E such that β
defeats α. Also, by Definition 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, arguments are only attacked by
trust-attacks, thus α ∈ TAttsC. Since Z is a subargument of X , by Definition 5
there is γ ∈ TAttsC such that tg(γ) = X , dis(γ) = dis(α) and og(γ) = og(α). By
Proposition 4 and Definition 6, we know that if there is no defeater in E for α
then there is no defeater in E for γ. Hence, X /∈ E in contradiction with the
original assumption.
As we have shown, reliability-attacks can defeat trust-attacks, turning the
latter ineffective. Given that trust-attacks model the conflicts between argu-
ments with contradictory conclusions, it is important to show that even in the
presence of reliability-attacks, in our formalism no extension will contain such
arguments together. This is formalized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Let C be a credibility base and E an extension of C, then there is
no pair of arguments X and Y in E, such that X and Y have contradictory
conclusions.
Proof. Suppose that there are X , Y in E such that X and Y have contradictory
conclusions. By Definition 5 and Corollary 1 it holds that there are φ = (X ,Y)
and ψ = (Y,X ), such that φ, ψ ∈ TAttsC. By Definition 12, we have that E is
conflict free, then φ, ψ /∈ E. Given that by Definition 12 X and Y are acceptable
with respect to E, there are α, β ∈ E such that α defeats φ and β defeats ψ. By
Definitions 5, 6, and 7 we have that α, β ∈ RAttsC. Then, by Definition 7 there
are γ, δ ∈ IAttsC such that γ defeats α and δ defeats β. Thus, by Definition 12
there should be , ω ∈ E such that  defeats δ and ω defeats γ. In particular,
those defeats should be direct defeats; otherwise,  would also defeat α and ω
would also defeat β. Then, by Definition 8, it holds that , ω ∈ E. Then, given
that for  and ω are in E we have an analogous case to that of α and β. This
leads us to an infinite amount of attacks, which is a contradiction.
As we mentioned in the introduction of this article, one of the main goals
of our system was to determine from a potentially conflicting credibility base a
strict partial order representing the credibilities that can be coherently justified.
As reported in [36], a set of justified credibilities from a credibility base is sound
if it is a strict partial order. The following theorem shows that our approach is
sound, i.e., every set of justified credibilities obtained from a credibility base is
sound.
Theorem 1. Let C be a credibility base with JE the set of justified credibilities
of an extension E of C. It holds that JE is a strict-partial order.
Proof. We have to prove that the relation expressed by the set JE is irreflexive,
asymmetric, and transitive.
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• Irreflexive: Suppose that JE is not irreflexive, then there is an A such
that A > A ∈ JE . Thus, there must exist an argument X such that its
conclusion is A > A, which is not possible.
• Asymmetric: Straightforward from Lemma 1 and Definition 14.
• Transitive: If A > B and B > C are in JE then we have two arguments X
and Y in E concluding A > B and B > C respectively. By Definition 2,
it holds that there is an argument Z = X ∪Y concluding A > C. Then X
and Y are subarguments of Z and, by Definition 13 it holds that Z ∈ E.
Therefore, A > C ∈ JE .
Finally, in Proposition 6 we show that when there are no conflicts in the
credibility base every element in that base will be a justified credibility under
any semantics. Then, in Proposition 7 we show that in a conflicting credibility
base there are elements in the base that will not be justified under any semantics.
Proposition 6. Let C be a credibility base with JE as the set of justified credi-
bilities of an extension E of C. If TAttsC = ∅, it holds that JE = cl(C)
Proof. • If A > B ∈ JE , by Definition 14 it holds that there is an argument
〈X , A>B〉 in E, thus 〈X , A>B〉 in ArgsC. By Definition 2 we have that
X ⊆ C and A > B ∈ cl(X ). Then A > B ∈ cl(C).
• If A > B ∈ cl(C), then there is X ⊆ C such that A > B ∈ cl(X ) and
X is the minimal set holding that. Then by Definition 2, 〈X , A > B〉 ∈
ArgsC. Additionally, given that TAttsC = ∅, it holds that RAttsC = ∅ and
IAttsC = ∅, then the associated AFRA of C is 〈ArgsC, ∅〉. Therefore, by
Definition 12 it holds that E = ArgsC. Then 〈X , A > B〉 ∈ E, and by
Definition 14 holds that A > B ∈ JE .
Proposition 7. Let C be a credibility base with JE the set of justified credibilities
of an extension E of C. If TAttsC = ∅ then it holds that JE ⊂ cl(C).
Proof. • If A > B ∈ JE then, by Definition 14, there is an argument 〈X , A>
B〉 in E. By Definition 2 it holds that X ⊆ C and A > B ∈ cl(X ). Then
A > B ∈ cl(C).
• Since TAttsC = ∅, there are two arguments with contradictory conclusions,
for instance, 〈X , A >B〉 and 〈Y, B >A〉. Then, by Definition 2 it holds
that A > B ∈ cl(X ), B > A ∈ cl(Y), X ⊆ C, and Y ⊆ C; thus, A > B
and B > A are in cl(C). By Definition 5 (X ,Y) and (Y,X ) are in TAttsC;
so, by Definitions 10 and 12, if X ∈ E it holds that Y /∈ E and, therefore,
by Definition 14 B > A /∈ JE . On the other hand, if Y ∈ E it holds that
X /∈ E, then by Definition 14 results that A > B /∈ JE .
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5. Applying our approach to real world domains
A possible application of our approach is to use the proposed mechanism
to estimate and maintain the credibility associated with individuals in a social
network. The idea is to feed our framework with the information emerging from
the interaction between the users of the network to obtain a (possibly partial)
ordering of said users that will reflect their credibility. This credibility relation
can then, in turn, be used by one of the users to help in deciding between
contradictory opinions/positions of two other users.
Let us consider for instance Twitter, which is an online news and social net-
working service that allows users to post and exchange short messages known
as “tweets”. A user in Twitter can propagate a tweet from another user by
“retweeting” it. A retweeted message contains a reference to the user who orig-
inally posted it. The strength of Twitter as a medium for information dissemi-
nation is based in large part on its speed and number of retweets. Retweeting
is often used as an indication that the original information was of high value
or significant interest for the retweeting user. There are studies showing that
retweeting indicates, not only interest in a message, but also trust in the mes-
sage and the originator [2, 26]. Therefore, retweets can be seen as indicators
of trust based on the propagation of information. That is, if a user A retweets
messages from a user B often, then it can be considered that user A implicitly
trusts user B [39].
We can use our formalism to measure user trust resulting of the retweet
behavior of a group of Twitter users. For this, based on the intuition mentioned
above, we can use the retweets as a measure of credibility among users. The idea
is to use the retweets from a user as an indicator of how credible are other users
for her. Then, intuitively, if user A retweets more from user B than from another
user C there is an indication that A will find B more credible than C. Using that
information, we will be able to construct a credibility object [B>C,A]. Each
user will have their own credibility assessment according to their retweeting
profile, and it is possible that two or more users have discrepancies in such
valuation. For instance, if we have that user D retweets more posts from user C
than posts from user B, then there is an indication that D finds more credible
C than B, contrasting with the assessment of user A discussed above. In this
scenario, we will construct [C>B,D]. Using our formalism, if we consider the
credibility objects for A and D, we will have two conflicting arguments (they
will trust-attack each other).
Another consideration regarding measuring user trust in this scenario is that
we have to deal with situations where users can retweet posts among each other
leading to potentially recursive valuation. Our formalism provides a tool to
reason with the above-mentioned conflicts in the context of such recursivity, as
we have shown through the paper. In particular, using reliability attacks, most
reliable sources will help decide among conflicts of assessment. Then, a user X
that is the one that has been the most retweeted (that is, simply counting how
much she has been retweeted) in our approach will not necessarily be the most
credible user. To decide this, a qualitative argumentation analysis will be carried
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out considering how reliable are the users that reportX as the most credible user
and how reliable are the users estimating the contrary. Also, contrasting with
the existing methods for user trust assessment the argumentation reasoning
mechanism provides an intelligible explanation of the trust valuation process
from a human point of view [17, 16]. Therefore, using our mechanism to measure
the credibility of Twitter users based on their retweeting profiles, would give a
user a qualitative and explanatory tool to choose when she has to make a decision
regarding the information that other users provide.
In the last years, the use of trust and reputation systems for enhancing on-
line service provision has been widely used (e.g., Amazon, eBay, GoogleMaps,
Trip Advisor, AirBnB, Stack Exchange). As stated in [21], those systems use
the aggregated ratings about a given party to derive a trust or reputation score,
which can assist other parties in deciding whether or not to transact with that
party in the future. A natural side effect is that it also provides an incentive
for good behavior, and therefore tends to have a positive effect on market qual-
ity. Any system that facilitates interaction between humans depends on how
they respond to it and people appear to respond well to online services that
have a reputation component despite some of them having drawbacks or being
somewhat primitive.
Note that in all the systems mentioned in the paragraph above, users rank
other users. Hence, our proposed approach can be used as a complement to
enhance the way in which reputation is assessed in those systems. Consider for
instance Stack Exchange which is a network of question-and-answer websites
on topics in varied fields, each site covering a specific topic in which questions,
answers, and users are subject to a reputation award process. Each users’
reputation score goes up when others users vote up questions, answers, and
edits (e.g., currently, +5 for a question voted up, +10 for an answer voted
up, +15 when an answer is accepted, and +2 for an edit approved). Once the
reputation score of a user reaches certain level, the user unlocks privileges like
the ability to vote, comment, and edit other users posts and also vote down
(that costs one reputation point). For instance, with a reputation score of 15
the user has the privilege to vote, with 50 the privilege to leave comments,
and with 125 to vote down. At the highest levels, users have access to special
moderation tools to keep the site focused and helpful.
Similarly to the application described above for Twitter, when users vote
other user’s questions or answers, not only they are increasing their partners’
reputation but also they are setting their preferences among them. That is, if
a user A gives more positive feedback (votes, etc.) to the user B than the user
C, then there is an indication that A finds B more credible than C. Also, if for
a query there are several answers given for instance by users G, H, and I and
user A votes for G’s answer, then a preference can be inferred: that for A user
G is more credible than H or I. Note that no preference of A over H or I can be
entailed. That is, in terms of our proposed notation [G>H,A] and [G>I,A].
In all the websites of the Stack Exchange community users rank other users,
then, following with this example, it can also be the case that for a different
user B, it can be inferred that [H>G,B]. Consider finally that from the same
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website it can be inferred that [A>B,X], then our proposed approach can be
applied to decide between two contradictory answers given by users G and H,
using more information than the rankings of these answers.
6. Related work
As we mentioned before in this article, and also in [36, 37], trust kept as a
credibility order can present contradictory information, that is, from a credibility
base it is possible to infer that an agent is more credible than other and vice
versa. To address this issue, in [36] the authors formalized change operators
over a credibility base following belief revision techniques aiming to maintain
credibility bases without contradictory information. Maintaining consistency
using those belief revision operators will lead to lose some information. Since
obtaining information is an expensive process, in contrast to [23], in order to
avoid losing information to maintain consistency, in our approach, we have
proposed to keep all beliefs even in situations in which the credibility bases
are contradictory. In dynamic scenarios where the trust model uses witness
information [28, 32] with many interactions, our approach covers cases in which
beliefs that are currently not important may become so in the future.
In [36] the credibility bases were defined in a similar manner as in the present
work. There, in order to determine which information prevails when contradic-
tory information arises, a reliability function was used to obtain a set of agent
identifiers which represents the credibility of a given credibility element, and
it considers all the agent identifiers involved in every minimal proof of that
credibility element. They follow a cautious approach: the function first obtains
the set with the least credible agent identifiers from each proof, and then, if
there exist more than one proof, the most credible identifiers of the resulting
set. Therefore, to compute the reliability of a credibility element, they use a
function min and a function max. Thus, based on a credibility base, they define
a function such that when given a credibility element in the transitive closure
of the credibility base will return a set of agent identifiers that represents the
reliability of the credibility element with respect to the credibility base. In our
work, where credibility bases may contain information in conflict, it becomes
unsound to compute reliability using the functions min and max because this
can lead to potential cycles. For this reason, in this article, we defined an ar-
gumentation formalism with recursive attacks which provides the capability to
infer a strict partial order from a credibility base (without contradictory infor-
mation). In addition, in [36], the possibility that an agent receives multiple
beliefs simultaneously, was not considered; for that reason, in that approach the
order in which the beliefs are acquired will affect which information is retained
by the agent. In contrast to [23], the proposal introduced here gives the capa-
bility of adding multiple beliefs simultaneously. This choice allows to address
cases where it is possible to join two or more bases without worrying about the
possible contradictions that may arise.
The works [27] and [38] propose an argumentation formalism that can be
used to reason using information about trust. This formalism is described as a
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set of graphs, and to determine agent’s beliefs the authors propose a model which
considers the trust in the information that is used for building arguments. Like
ours, this approach is intended for a multi-agent setting and informant agents
can have different credibilities. In contrast to our work, where each agent has its
own credibility order, they use a centralized notion of trust that is codified in a
shared trust network. This global network holds information about how agents
trust each other and can be used to obtain an agent-centric trust network that
represents the viewpoint of a particular agent. Although from these graphs it
is possible to determine a credibility order for each agent, these orderings are
strongly dependent on the connections in the global network. In contrast, in our
work each agent has its own credibility order which is completely independent
from the credibility order of any other agent. Another significant difference
is that they use numerical values to establish the trust relation among agents,
leading to a total order on the set of agents. In contrast, our approach uses sym-
bolic information and an argumentation system to infer a strict partial order.
Similarly to our formalism, each piece of information is linked to an agent that
determines how credible this information is, and the formalism in [27, 38] uses
an argumentation inference mechanism to deal with a potentially contradictory
belief base. Nevertheless, unlike in our approach, in theirs there are no inconsis-
tencies in the trust networks and their beliefs do not involve information about
trust. Their argumentation system uses trust information from these networks
to reason with non-trust referring beliefs while, in contrast, ours uses credibility
information to reason about the potential conflicts in the credibility.
In [18, 19], in a manner similar to ours, the authors use a symbolic approach
to model credibility using two global relations: the trust relation and the distrust
relation. These relations together with the set of agents constitute a trust
system. A pair (a, b) in the trust (distrust) relation determines that agent a
trusts (distrusts) agent b. Their formalism aims to determine whether an agent
trusts another taking into account the potential conflicts that may appear when
the trust and distrust relations are analyzed together in the trust system. To
do this, they follow an argumentation approach in which arguments represent
a position for an agent to either trust or distrust a peer. Additionally, when
considering an advanced version of their system, each agent is also provided with
a partial order defined among its peers, using this order to codify the efficacy
in which this agent trusts its peers (aiming to model a grade of trustworthiness
or reputation). Even if this can be seen as similar to the credibility base of
our proposal, their efficacy measure is a partial order while our bases, as we
have shown in various examples, are not necessarily ordered. Therefore, their
efficacy is a consistent measure while a credibility base can have credibility
conflicts. In addition, they use these efficacy orders to provide strength to their
arguments in order to decide if an agent trusts another or not, while we use the
credibility base to build arguments and reason about the credibility itself. In
this sense, the goal of the argumentation systems differ. They aim to decide if
an agent trusts another or not from the trust and distrust relation, while our
formalism aims to determine a partial order form a potentially contradictory
credibility base. Nevertheless, similarly to us, their proposal aims to enrich the
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trust mechanisms by allowing the representation of conflicting trust notions and
use an argumentation mechanism to decide which information prevails. It could
be interesting to study how to integrate our credibility bases with their efficacy
measure and how our formalism could consider trust and distrust relations as
theirs.
In our system, given the nature in which reliability-attacks are generated, a
weakest link approach is used to decide between conflicting arguments (between
trust-attacks, specifically). With this we aim to capture the notion that an ar-
gument for a credibility element is as weak as the weakest (least reliable) source
that provided information to build such an argument. Intuitively, using this
approach in a conflicting situation, the more sources used to build an argument
the more chances that the argument ends up defeated. Nevertheless, it is worth
to mention that, in our model, we do not explicitly deal with the problem of
assessing the trustworthiness of a piece of information considering the amount
of sources needed to infer it. There are more comprehensive approaches to deal
with this problem like [11, 22]. In [22], an argumentation mechanism based on
trust is used as a layer of a belief revision process for agents dealing with (poten-
tially conflicting) opinions about their pairs. In that argumentation approach,
trust is used to build a preference ordering amongst arguments. First, they
aggregate the information of the different opinions regarding the same propo-
sition. Then, using these aggregated propositions, they build arguments whose
trustworthiness is assessed using a conjunctive fusion operator over the opin-
ions forming the argument. This assessment considers the number of agents and
information pieces which where needed for building the argument. The work
of [11] is similar to [22] in the sense that they use the argumentation mechanism
as part of a belief revision process to deal with potentially conflicting infor-
mation obtained from different sources. Agents transmit complete arguments
and, to calculate trustworthiness, they use the most trustworthy source that
communicated an argument in an iterative fuzzy labeling process. Even though
these works do not have explicit mechanisms for considering agents that provide
information about the trust relation on their peers, it could be interesting to
adapt some of their ideas to our system. For that purpose, we can think of
two alternatives: either extend the notion of basic reliability-attack to consider
the above mentioned strategies, or extend the AFRA to consider preferences
codifying these strategies.
In [12], the authors propose a framework over multi-agent systems which uses
trust to make decisions. Like ours, the agents interact exchanging information
and these agents consider the sources to compute the trust of the information;
however, they perform the computation of credibilities through a possibilistic
model which they use to determine the acceptance of information in a framework
to support belief revision. In our framework, we adopt a symbolic approach and
the credibility of a piece of information is evaluated considering all the credibility
objects using an argumentation framework. Furthermore, their proposal works
in scenarios that are not necessarily collaborative using trust and distrust, where
the credibility of a piece of information represents the capability of the agent
to evaluate the tenability of the piece of information with respect to its own
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competence and the ones of the sources.
In [29], a qualitative bipolar argumentative modeling of trust is proposed.
Similar to our proposal, their approach is qualitative and only a finite number
of levels is assumed in the trust scale. In contrast with our proposal they use a
bipolar argumentative approach where trust and distrust can be independently
assessed. In their approach, an agent can evaluate its trust into an object X
(that can be either a source or another agent) on the basis of two types of
information: the observed behaviour of X, and the reputation of X according
to the other agents. Reputation information is viewed as an input information
used for revising or updating its own trust evaluation based on its perception.
Two kinds of arguments in favour of trusting an agent (either pointing out
that a good point is reached or a bad point is avoided), and also two kinds of
arguments against trusting an agent can be constructed (either pointing out
that a bad point is satisfied or that a good point is not reached). These four
kinds of arguments are based on an inference rule and the trust evaluation of the
agent, that is represented with an interval [t−, t+] over a discrete scale S, with
the intended meaning that the trust is not larger than t+ and not smaller than
t−. Although the paper indicates some basic mechanisms leading to revision of
trust values, it is mainly focused on trust evaluation rather than trust dynamics
in a multiple-agent world.
The work reported in [23], describes an approach that enables personalized
communication about trust. The proposal is based on certain capabilities an
agent must have. Namely, the ability to adapt its trust model to personalize
its evaluations to the other agent’s needs, the capability of communicating its
criteria for evaluating trust together with the beliefs and goals that led to these
criteria, and the willingness and ability to change its trust model when and if it
is persuaded that it is wrong. A difference with the work presented here is that
their proposal considers aggregation and a dialogue between agents to obtain
conclusions regarding trust. We have concentrated on producing a system that
addresses the problem of receiving trust information where the argumentation
process is circumscribed to that information, while Koster et al. consider the
beliefs and goals of the participants to build the arguments. It is interesting to
note that it could be possible to integrate both systems in a sufficiently complex
framework; this effort is outside the current goals of this research.
7. Conclusions and future work
The importance of having trust models has been widely emphasized in the
literature. In multi-agent systems, representing and making possible the eval-
uation of the credibility associated with a piece of information is important,
especially when the agents have their own beliefs and can obtain new informa-
tion from other sources [12]. As stated in [28, 32], two elements have contributed
to substantially increase the interest on trust in this area: the dissemination of
the multi-agent paradigm to implement distributed systems and the dramatic
evolution of e-commerce. The study of trust has many applications in Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies; e.g., trust has been recognized as a
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key factor for successful e-commerce adoption. These systems are used by au-
tonomous software agents as a mechanism to search for trustworthy exchange
partners and as an incentive in decision-making about whether or not to honor
contracts. Our proposal can be applied to any system requiring that trust or
credibility of informants be taken into account or in approaches in which users
can review or provide opinions about other users, as we mentioned in Section 5.
In this work, we have proposed an argumentative framework with recursive
attacks to address a trust model in a collaborative open multi-agent system. We
have focused in scenarios where agents share information about the credibility
or informational trust they have assigned to their peers (referred to as wit-
ness information in the literature). We have represented informants’ credibility
through credibility objects which include not only trust information (credibility
element) but also the informant source. These objects are maintained in a cred-
ibility base which can store information in conflict. Thus, when an agent needs
to determine the credibility of its peers to make decisions, the agent needs an
ordered set of informants without information in conflict.
Here, we have presented a system capable of building a partially ordered
credibility relation from a potentially contradictory credibility base by using
argumentative inference. Such relation is not any arbitrary subset of partially
ordered credibility elements obtained from the credibility base; actually, the
output of our system is a subset of credibility elements that can be justified after
an argumentation process. In this process, we aimed to select the most reliable
information when conflicts are analyzed. In the formalism, an argument is a
reason why an agent may infer that an informant is preferred over other; these
reasons are tentative and can be challenged for other reasons through attacks.
As we have shown, the reliability measure in our approach depends only on
the credibility relation, leading to a recursive scenario where this credibility can
be also in conflict or challenged. To capture these recursive relations, we have
introduced different forms of attacks to attacks. The key element for this are
the reliability-attacks, whose goal is to capture the intuition that an argument
or an attack based on potentially more credible sources can not be defeated
by another with lesser credible sources. These attacks are considered by the
argumentation mechanism to decide which arguments are accepted, which in
turn are the arguments that support the credibility elements that we consider
as justified.
To reason argumentatively with the recursive interactions, we instantiated
an AFRA [3, 4] with the arguments and attacks of a credibility base, and used
the notions of acceptability semantics already defined for such framework. This
framework was selected because it was conceived and equipped with tools that
naturally deal with recursive attacks and regards attacks as defeasible entities.
As pointed out in [7] the defeasibility of attacks can be a useful modeling tool
when we are dealing with meta-argumentation such as in our case: an argument
producing a reliability-attack to a trust-attack is arguing about the acceptability
status of arguments involved in the trust-attacks. Alternatively, we could have
used another argumentation framework such as [14]; however, that would have
lead us to use an artificial encoding of the recursive relations using special
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arguments and to formalize the intuition of the acceptance status of these special
arguments.
We used the notion of acceptability semantics to determine which are the
acceptance status of the arguments in our system; in particular, we committed
to the extensional approach of the preferred semantics. We have formally shown
that extensions are sound, i.e., there is no pair of arguments holding contradic-
tory conclusions in an extension, and we have shown that the conclusions of an
extension from a credibility base constitute a partial order with respect to the
credibility relation. We have also shown that when a credibility base has several
extensions, each one corresponds to a choice of arguments and attacks involved
in conflicts that could not be resolved using reliability.
As future work, we intent to develop a complete implementation of our pro-
posal. Our idea is to develop tools for generating the arguments and attacks
of a credibility base and integrate them with some of the recent methods for
extension enumeration in abstract argumentation (such as jArgSemSAT [10]).
For such an integration, as previously mentioned in Section 4, we could use the
existing methods for transforming AFRAs into classical argumentation frame-
works. Having such implementation will allow us to throughly evaluate our
approach using real world data, in the context of the applications described in
Section 5. We also want to integrate the notion of distrust along to the cred-
ibility relation, in non collaborative scenarios. Our idea in this regard is to
use another type of attack to model the inherent conflicts between these two
notions, and to consider the problem of identity theft. Also we will study how
to integrate our credibility bases with the efficacy measure used in [18, 19] to
reason with trust and distrust relations. In addition, we want to study how our
approach can be combined with other argumentation frameworks that use trust
as a decision support mechanism, such as [38]. Finally, it is also clear that a
bootstrapping mechanism is needed; one alternative to effect this process could
be to use direct experience [32]. Such alternative is left as future work.
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